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Conventions as well as standards influence the practice of financial reporting. 
Financial reporting standards arise as legislated rules, enforced by the power of law. 
Conventions evolve over time through trial and practice, and are upheld by 
socioeconomic rewards and sanctions.  Financial reporting in the second half of the 
twentieth century has been characterized by a preference for legislated standards, and a 
distinct lack of faith in its evolution as a body of social conventions. Evidence on whether 
this faith in standards over conventions is justified remains to be marshaled. We present 
data on privacy practices in e-commerce under the European Union’s (EU’s) formal 
regulatory regime prevailing in the United Kingdom (U.K.), and compare it to the data 
from a previous study of United States (U.S.) practices that evolved in the absence of 
government laws or enforcement.  The codification by the EU law, and the enforcement 
by the U.K. government, improves neither the disclosure nor the practice of e-commerce 
privacy relative to the U.S.  On the contrary, some evidence shows the unregulated 
practices in U.S. to be superior. Regulation in the U.K. also appears to stifle development 
of a market for web assurance services. Both U.S. and U.K. consumers continue to be 
vulnerable to a small number of e -commerce websites who spam their customers, 
ignoring the latter’s expressed or implied preferences. We explore the implications of 
these results for understanding the merits of enforced standards and conventions in the 
domain of financial reporting. 
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1. Introduction  
During the seven decades since the creation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the concept of Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP) 
has gradually, but steadily, shifted from evolved social conventions toward legislated 
standards.  Informal sanctions and reinforcements that sustain the evolution and 
effectiveness of social conventions have gradually been replaced by formal surveillance 
and penalties, backed by regulatory power to enforce the legislated standards.  This 
fundamental shift in financial reporting regime, initiated in the United States (U.S.), has 
gradually spread to the rest of the world. The London-based International Accountings 
Standards Board (IASB, note the parallel nomenclature), which hopes to have its 
standards accepted around the globe, is the most notable example of the broad acceptance 
of the idea that legislated standards, backed by governmental power of enforcement, is a 
preferred financial reporting regime. Social conventions, backed by informal sanctions 
and market consequences, command little following at the turn of this century.   
The widespread creation of institutions to write and enforce financial reporting 
standards has been accompanied by surprisingly little theoretical or empirical analysis of 
their possible merits relative to the evolutionary approach.  Such analyses could be 
facilitated by the development of a framework that permits comparison of deliberately 
designed mechanisms or legislated standards on one hand, and evolved norms on the 
other. Hayek’s ([1973], Chapter 1: Reason and Evolution) comparison of designed and 
evolved mechanisms is a good example. Coleman’s [1990] analysis of social norms is 
another.  
In this paper we present a direct comparison of empirical observations from a 
parallel field of e-commerce privacy, which is relevant to financial reporting.  Jamal, 
Maier and Sunder (JMS, [2003]) documented the e-commerce privacy standards and 
practices in the U.S. where little government regulation or enforcement exists. The 
present study documents the e-commerce privacy practices and standards in the United                                                                                                                                




Kingdom (U.K.) where the Information Commission, a British government agency, 
currently enforces the privacy law of the European Union (EU). 
A comparison of the U.S. and the U.K. practices reveals that the frequency of 
junk email received by those who register at e-commerce websites in the two countries is 
about the same. Only a small number of websites in the two countries violate the privacy 
of their customers by sharing personally identifiable information with third parties.
1 
However, the unregulated disclosures of privacy policies in U.S. dominate the regulated 
disclosures in U.K. (from the consumer’s point of view). This comparison raises 
important questions about the validity of the assumption that the standardized and 
enforced financial reporting regimes, which have gained significant currency around the 
world in recent years, dominate the evolutionary approach of generally accepted 
accounting principles.   
The recent advent of e -commerce provides an opportunity to observe and 
compare privacy standards, disclosure, auditing and practices, with and without a 
regulatory regime in place. JMS [2003] documented the prevailing disclosure policies, 
the development of a market for independent web assurance services, and the privacy 
practices of 100 high traffic e-commerce websites in the U.S. during the second half of 
the year 2001.  The key findings of JMS are: (1) Most e-commerce websites in the U.S. 
behave responsibly, provide good disclosure, and honor opt-in or opt-out choices of 
consumers, and (2) A small number of e -commerce websites account for an 
overwhelming proportion of abuses of consumer privacy.    
In the present study, we use the JMS field experiment method and design to 
examine the disclosure and privacy practices of 56 high traffic websites in the U.K. 
which are formally regulated by the EU privacy law which have been incorporated into 
U.K. national privacy law (see Appendix A). The Information Commission (IC), 
monitors and enforces compliance with this law (see Appendix B for measures of 
compliance effort). We examine compliance with two key aspects of the law for which 
JMS have documented the corresponding U.S. practices: (1) The requirement to provide 
disclosure or notice of what consumer information is gathered and used by the website, 
                                                 
1 We do not consider the security breaches which are unintentional, but have the same effect on violating 
the privacy of customers. For example, see Tedeschi [2003].                                                                                                                                




and  (2) The consent requirement that consumers be provided with an option to control 
how their personal information is used by a website for secondary purposes.  
Our results indicate that (1) Disclosure of privacy practices in the U.K. are no 
better, perhaps worse, than in the U.S. It is more difficult to find the privacy policy of a 
U.K. website, and compliance with the disclosure requirements of the U.K. privacy laws 
are generally quite poor. (2) Most websites in the U.K. honor the opt-out choices made by 
customers, just as in the U.S. Again there is no indication that U.K. websites behave 
better on average than their U.S. counterparts. (3) Most of the email received by the U.K. 
registrants comes from a single website that does not honor the opt-out option chosen by 
registrants, again similar to what happens in the U.S.  (4) Even in the opt-in condition, 
most of the email comes from a single website, just as in the U.S.  Overall we find no 
important differences between the average behavior of the British and American websites 
in this respect.  Consumers in both regimes remain vulnerable to a small number of 
websites who misbehave. In the U.S., better companies have the opportunity to signal 
their good intentions to their visitors by investing a small amount of money in purchasing 
a web-seal from an independent provider such as TRUSTe or BBB Online.  In the 
regulatory regime of the U.K., the market for web-seals does not exist.  We outline the 
implications of the privacy findings for financial reporting in Section 5. 
 
2. Regulation of Privacy Practices in the U.S. and U.K 
 
  The concept of privacy is deemed to be central to the development of an 
autonomous self and hence an important facet of individual liberty (DeCew [1999]). 
Until recently, privacy rights focused on the intimate details of one’s life, such as the 
right to be silent about one’s sexual preference, and the right to abortion. In addition, 
there was a general concern about providing government or other institutional authorities 
with too much information. There was less concern with privacy in business (DeCew 
[1999]). 
That began to change with the rise of drug use in the general population in the 
1960’s and the1970’s as business firms began to test prospective, even current, 
employees for drug use. More recently, electronic  surveillance of the behavior of 
employees, and employer access to employees’ genetic and medical records has raised                                                                                                                                




new privacy concerns relating to business (Kupfer, [1993], Brockett and Tankersley, 
[1997]). 
With the Internet and the development of e-commerce, privacy issues became 
more complicated as a result of the new technology. New e-commerce technology has 
substantially increased the ability of online merchants to collect, monitor, target, profile 
and even sell personal information about customers to third parties (JMS [2003]).  The 
intrusiveness of telemarketing activity and spam has raised the profile of privacy issues 
involving business. 
In response to broad societal concerns about privacy, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development  (OECD), the U.S. government, and the EU 
began extensive discussions in the 1970s about developing a regulatory framework for 
privacy. These discussions were guided by five privacy principles enumerated by the 
OECD [1980]: (1) Notice/Awareness: Participants should receive notice of an entity’s 
information practices before they divulge any personal information. (2) Choice/Consent: 
Participants should be given options as to the uses of any personal information collected 
from them, especially for secondary uses that are unrelated to complete the original 
transaction (e.g., sale of information to third parties). (3) Access /Participation: A 
participant should have access to the information recorded about him and be able to 
modify any information that is deemed incorrect. (4) Integrity/Security: Collectors must 
take reasonable steps to ensure data integrity, convert it into anonymous form before 
using it for secondary purposes and destroy untimely data. (5) Enforcement/Redress: 
There must be a mechanism in place to enforce the privacy policies.  
The EU decided to adopt a formal (legal) regulatory framework for the protection 
of privacy. In 1995 the EU parliament formalized the EU privacy law by passing the 
European Directive on Data Protection (EU Directive 95/46/EC).  The Directive adopted 
the abovementioned five principles, and required the member countries to bring their 
national laws into compliance.
2 The Directive stipulated that personal data must be 
processed fairly and lawfully and only collected for a specified, explicit, and legitimate 
purpose. The use of data for any secondary purposes beyond the stated purposes is 
prohibited. Data cannot be kept any longer than needed to serve the stated purpose, and 
the data can only be collected if the person has given his or her consent. There is some 
                                                 
2 These laws apply  to all data collected on-line and off-line.                                                                                                                                




discretion available to each member country to define what “consent” means.  Some 
countries, such as France, require consent to be obtained explicitly (“opt-in”), whereas 
the U.K. has a more permissive definition which allows consent to be implied as long as 
consumers are provided with an opportunity to opt-out of the use of their personal data 
for secondary purposes.  The European Directive also requires each member government 
to create an independent government body to monitor the development, implementation 
and enforcement of national data protection law.  Given that the U.S. has no law covering 
most websites, it is generally considered that, with respect to privacy laws, the EU has 
much stricter (and legally binding) standards and enforcement thereof than the U.S. does.  
Data protection in the U.K. is regulated by the Data Protection Act (DPA) of 
1984, which was significantly amended in 1998 for compliance with the EU Privacy 
Directive (Reidenberg and Schwartz [1998]). The Information Commission (IC), a U.K. 
government agency, is responsible for the monitoring and enforcement required by the 
EU directive.  All entities collecting personal data must register with the Commission. 
The Commission has the statutory power to monitor compliance with the DPA, and can 
serve “enforcement notices” that direct a registered person to take specific steps to 
comply with the Act. The Commission can also cancel registration, prohibit overseas 
transfer of data, and can initiate prosecution of violators of the Act.   Failure to register is 
subject to prosecution. Administrative decisions of the Commission, especially the 
enforcement notices, can be appealed to an independent Data Protection Tribunal. The 
budget of the IC more than doubled from    £3,661,690 in fiscal year 1997-98 to 
£8,244,982 in 2001-02.  Enforcement activities of the Information Commissioner are 
summarized in Appendix B. During the five-year period from 1997-2002, the IC filed 
331 court cases and obtained 277 convictions for violation of the privacy law. Precedents 
established by the Data Protection Tribunal require that privacy notices be displayed in 
large, easy to read size in a prominent location, at the point where personal information is 
first collected. Reidenberg and Schwartz [1998] provide a detailed discussion of the EU 
privacy law and a comparison of national privacy laws of Belgium, France, Germany, 
and the U.K.   
1995 was a watershed year—the EU passed its Privacy Directive and the U.S. did 
not pass a general privacy law. TRUSTe was formed in 1996 as a non-profit organization 
to promote better privacy practices and many U.S. websites voluntarily display a                                                                                                                                




TRUSTe web-seal to signal their compliance with the privacy standards formulated by 
TRUSTe. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) started holding workshops in 1995 to 
discuss and promote good privacy practices. The FTC also tried to push e-commerce 
websites to improve their privacy practices by conducting studies (which combined a 
review of privacy policies and surveys) i n 1998, 1999 and 2000.  Each FTC study 
showed improvement in the actual practices of U.S. websites (FTC 2000). Congress has 
not passed any general privacy legislation to date, although several anti-spam laws are in 
the legislative process in mid-2003. 
   As of mid 2003, in the U.S., there is virtually no government regulation of 
privacy, and no legal requirement to disclose privacy policies in e-commerce or on the 
Internet. Once a person discloses information in the process of registering or transacting 
at a site, there are no legal constraints on what can be done with that personal information 
so long as no fraudulent actions are involved.  There is no requirement that a site have a 
privacy policy, that consumers be informed about what data is being collected about 
them, and that consumers be provided with an option to give or deny their consent to 
secondary uses of the data gathered.   In addition, there are no legally mandated audit 
procedures, nor are the e-commerce sites required by law to have their privacy policies 
certified by independent auditors
3.  
  
3. Research Method and Results For Notice/Awareness Study 
 
We gathered data from 56 high traffic websites in the U.K. by repeating the 
procedure used in the JMS [2003] study: first we obtained the addresses of high traffic 
websites from Jupiter Media Metrix (www.mediametrix.com), who monitors web usage 
and provides research and consulting services for online advertising. For countries other 
than the U.S., Media Metrix issues monthly reports of the top 15 active websites based on 
user traffic. We reviewed the top 15 reports from April 1999 – April 2002.  This resulted 
in the identification of 28 websites that had been listed at least once in the top 15 rating 
report. We then picked firms in the U.K. Financial Times Index and looked for their 
websites.  An additional 28 websites were identified where consumers could register or 
                                                 
3 There are two exceptions to the lack of U.S. regulation of privacy- the health care industry and the 
financial services industry are governed by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA - 1996) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA- 1999) respectively.                                                                                                                                




engage in transactions. A total of 56 high traffic websites in the U.K. were identified 
during the summer of 2002.  
We programmed a web crawler to visit these sites and to record the use of their 
own, as well as any third party cookies. We also obtained an electronic copy of the 
privacy policies of these websites and looked for disclosure about cookie usage and the 
use of third party cookies. Our crawler visited each of the 56 websites five times during 
the week of June 4 -11, 2002.  Some websites in the U.K. do not display a privacy policy 
until the consumer actually registers or initiates a transaction.  We attempted to register 
or initiate a transaction during June 11-20 in order to identify the use of cookies.  During 
the same period (May 27- June 12, 2002), a research assistant (who did not know the 
results generated by the web crawler) downloaded and date stamped the privacy policy of 
each website.  The data collected using the crawler and by manual review of the privacy 
policies was combined in a spreadsheet for the analysis given below. 
 
3.1 Disclosure (Notice/Awareness) Results 
The results of the disclosure of privacy policies of the 56 high traffic U.K. 
websites are presented in Table 1 (alongside, for ease of comparison, the results from 100 
high traffic U.S. websites reported by JMS).  In the U.S., JMS report that 34 websites had 
paid for a privacy assurance web-seal from an independent party (30 TRUSTe, 2 BBB 
Online, and 2 had both TRUSTe and BBB Online). None of the websites in the U.K. 
displayed a web-seal. One consequence of a legislated standards approach to privacy 
appears to be the elimination, or preclusion, of a market for private web assurance.  Since 
the law requires a disclosure of privacy policies but not privacy audit, there is no market 
for privacy assurance seals in the U.K. The privacy disclosure law appears to have 
eliminated the incentives for the websites to use web-seals as signals of their good 
privacy practices to consumers.    
In the U.S., JMS reported that it was easy to locate the privacy policies of 
virtually all (97 percent) of the websites in the sample.  In most cases, it could be located 
from the home page. In the U.K., we found it difficult to locate privacy policies on 
websites. The U.K. law requires the privacy policy to be provided before any personal 
data is collected. We therefore looked for the policy at the main home page, the 
registration page, and the page where personal information was entered. Our search                                                                                                                                




succeeded in only 77 percent of the websites in our sample.  This suggests low 
compliance with the legal requirement to provide a privacy policy, and the precedents set 
by the Data Protection Tribunal requiring privacy policies to be prominent, easy to read, 
and provided before personal information is collected.  Perhaps U.S. websites view the 
disclosure of privacy policies as an instrument of their marketing strategy to attract 
consumers, and make it easy to find this policy.  U.K. websites, on the other hand, appear 
to view privacy disclosure as a matter of barely complying with the law, and make it 
quite difficult to find their statements of policy.  
In the U.S., JMS [2003] reported that all 34 of the privacy seal websites, and 64 of 
the remaining 66 non-seal websites, used cookies, for an overall 98 percent cookie usage.  
The disclosure of cookie usage was also high, with all 34 privacy seal websites and 55 of 
the remaining 64 websites (overall 91 percent) disclosing their cookie usage.  In the U.K. 
the rate of cookie usage was lower, with only 88 percent (49 out of 56 websites) using 
cookies to monitor consumers (p<0.01).  The disclosure rate of cookie usage in the U.K. 
was also lower, with only 80 percent (39 out of 49) of the websites who use cookies 
disclosing their use thereof (p<0.05). Relative to the U.S., the formal legal codification of 
cookie disclosure requirements appears not to have improved disclosures in the U.K. 
In the U.S., JMS [2003] report that third parties placed cookies on visitor hard 
drives in 31 (91 percent) of the websites with seals, and 48 (73 percent) of the websites 
without a seal, for an overall third party cookie usage rate of 79 percent.  Thirty websites 
with a seal (97 percent) disclosed the presence of these third-party cookies on their site. 
Thirty of the 48 websites without a seal who were placing third party cookies (63 
percent) disclosed the presence of third parties, for an overall third party cookie 
disclosure rate of 76 percent.  In the U.K. websites were much less likely to allow third 
parties to use cookies to monitor customer behavior with only 50 percent of websites (28 
out of 56) allowing third parties to place cookies from their site (p<0.000).  In the U.K., 
27 out of 28 of these websites (96 percent) disclosed the presence of third party cookies 
on their site.  This is comparable to the 97 percent disclosure rate of the sites with a web-
seal in the U.S., and better than the average U.S. disclosure rate of 76 percent (p<0.01).  
For the remaining items in Table 1 (more explanation about cookies, third party 
cookies, and especially how data is used for secondary purposes), the disclosure rates in 
the U.K. are all lower than the disclosure rates reported by JMS [2003] for U.S. websites                                                                                                                                




(p<0.01).  Overall, it is clear that the privacy disclosures of the U.K. websites are no 
better than the privacy disclosures in the U.S. The rates of non-compliance with the 
requirements of the U.K. law are substantial; and only the third party cookie disclosure 
rates (96 percent) indicate a high level of compliance. 
 
4. Research Method and Results For Choice/Consent Study 
 
According to choice/consent, the second of the five OECD privacy principles, 
participants should be given an option to restrict the use of any personal information 
collected from them, especially for secondary uses unrelated to the processing of the 
transaction at hand.  Websites use two primary options to let users control the use of their 
personal information.  Opt-out, the most common option, allows users to explicitly 
restrict the website from transferring their data to any third party not involved directly in 
processing the transaction for which the data were collected.  A second option is to 
require an explicit “opt-in” from the consumer, which expressly permits the website to 
use the data for secondary purposes such as internal and possibly external marketing. The 
opportunity to opt-out (or opt-in) is widely regarded as a key choice mechanism and U.K. 
law requires that at least an opt-out option should be provided whenever personal data is 
collected.
4 The evidence gathered is summarized next. 
We examined the effectiveness of the “opt-out” feature of websites by registering 
on the same 56 high-traffic websites used to test disclosure policies in Section 3 above. 
We used the JMS [2003] procedure to monitor compliance of websites with privacy 
standards.  We set up a private U.K. domain name, created 112 identities (name, U.K. 
email address, U.K. based postal address, U.K. phone number with voice mail, and credit 
card number).  These email accounts were secure in our private domain and could not be 
accessed by robots or telemarketers looking for public directories of email addresses. 
Each of the 56 pairs of identities could be uniquely traced to one of the 56 website where 
we used it for registration.  
We registered twice on each of the 56 websites under two different identities.
 
Following the JMS procedure, we conducted one transaction (e.g., sent a greeting or 
email, or set up a portfolio) at the time of registration.  We used the first set of 56                                                                                                                                




identities to register on each of the 56 websites and did not place any restriction on 
having our data shared with others, that is, we “opted-in” to receive messages and 
materials, such as magazines, relevant to our simulated identity.  The second set of 
identities was used to register again on the same sites, where we “opted-out” immediately 
from having our information shared with both internal and any external parties.  In the 
second registration we did not accept any free offers. Note that our registration procedure 
enabled us to uniquely identify the 112 sources (opt-in and opt-out registrations at 56 
sites) of any incoming email because the name and email address used in each 
registration were different. All registrations were completed between September 2 -8, 
2002. 
 
4.1 Results: Choice/ Consent 
We attempted to register on all 56 websites used in the disclosure part of the 
study.  Of the 56 websites, 40 websites allowed us to opt-in, and only 25 websites 
allowed us to opt-out. Table 2 shows the weekly means (standard deviations) of the 
number of email messages received over the 26-week period following the registrations 
in the U.S. (as reported by JMS) and our data from the U.K.  The top part of Figure 1 
shows a chart of the weekly mean frequency of email messages from the U.S. opt-in 
(gray square), and the U.K. opt-in (black square). The two middle lines in Figure 1 show 
the U.S. opt-in excluding the highest volume website  (gray triangle), and the U.K. opt-in 
excluding the highest volume website (black triangle).  The bottom two lines in Figure 1 
show the U.S. opt-out (gray circle), and the U.K. opt-out (black circle) website 
registrations in both the U.S. and the U.K.  Most websites generated one confirmation 
message immediately following the registration.   
JMS reported receiving few messages from opt-out registrations in the U.S.; the 
mean was only 0.45 messages per week. JMS also reported that most of the messages in 
the opt-out condition were generated by a handful of websites; one site generated 48 
percent of all email messages and the top five sites accounted for 92 percent of all email 
received.  Excluding these outliers, the mean number of weekly email messages was 
close to 0.  In the present study of U.K. opt-out registrants, we received 468 commercial 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 An opt-in system protects privacy better than opt-out does, because each option is the default for the 
other. Most users end up with the default option through their failure to make an explicit choice between 
opt-in and opt-out.                                                                                                                                




email messages over the 26-week data collection period, for an average of 0.75 messages 
per week from opt-out registrations.  The U.K. data are also largely driven by a single 
website that accounted for 93 percent of all the messages from opt-out websites. If we 
exclude this outlier, the mean number of weekly messages to opt-out registrants in the 
U.K. is also close to 0. The difference between the average number of messages received 
from opt-out registrations in the U.S. and the U.K. is not statistically significant. It does 
not matter if we look at all the data (GLM, F[1,65)=0.28, p=0.6007), or exclude the one 
extreme observation from the U.K. data, and five extreme observations from the U.S. 
data (GLM,F[1,59]=1.15, p<0.288)
5.   
For opt-in registrants in the U.S., JMS reported receiving significantly more email 
with a mean of 8.44 emails per week. As in the opt-out condition, JMS reported that one 
outlier generated 56% of all the opt-in messages received. After excluding this outlier, 
the mean level of email was 3.81 per week in the U.S. (still significantly more than the 
mean level of email received by opt-out registrants at p<0.000).  In the present study, the 
U.K. opt-in registrants received 9,563 email messages over the 26-week period of this 
study for an average of 9.20 messages per registration per week.  This is 12 times the 
average volume of email messages received by the opt-out registrants. Paired sample t-
test yields a mean difference of 8.45 (t = 14.74, 25 df, p <0.000). This result in the U.K. 
of opt-in receiving more email than opt-out registrants is also consistent with the data 
reported by JMS [2003] for the U.S.  
Beginning with an average of about 2 email messages per week in the first week 
(see Figure 1, black square legend) the average level of email from U.K. websites rose 
steadily to about 14 per week in week 26.  Like the opt-out results described earlier, the 
U.K. opt-in results were also driven in large part by a single website.   Some 66 percent 
of all opt-in messages (a total of 6,342 messages over 26 weeks for an average of 244 per 
week) came from this single registration. Excluding the messages from this one outlier 
(black triangle legend), the email volume from the U.K. based opt-in sites gradually rises 
from about 2 per week to about 4.5 per week by the end of the 26-week period. This is 
more than 4 times the email volume for the opt-out registrants. Excluding the outlier data 
from the opt-in sample, the opt-in messages (mean of 3.18 email messages per week) 
                                                 
5 We obtain the same pattern of results even if we eliminate only 3 outliers from the U.S. opt-out data F 
(1,61) = 0.18, p=0.6691.                                                                                                                                




continues to be significantly more than the opt-out messages (mean difference = 2.42, 
t=27.55, 25 df, p< 0.000).  This pattern of results also replicates the U.S. data reported by 
JMS [2003].  There is no significant difference between the opt-in email level in the U.S. 
and the U.K. for both total email received (GLM, F[1,107]= 0.01, p=0.9231) as well as 
after excluding one outlier from each of the U.K. and the U.S. opt-in data (GLM, 
F[1,105]=0.14, p=0.7063). 
 
5. Implications For Financial Reporting 
 
As outlined in Section 2, the U.K. (and the EU) chose to protect the privacy of 
their citizens by legislating standards to be monitored and enforced under the powers of 
government. The U.S., on the other hand, chose, by deliberation or default, to allow the 
privacy policies in e -commerce to evolve as norms or conventions of e -commerce 
without legislated standards or a punitive enforcement mechanism.  
Our comparative study of the performance of these two regimes covers two 
dimensions of privacy. On the choice/consent dimension (i.e., participants controlling any 
secondary uses of their personal information) we find that the performance of the two 
regimes, as measured by the number of email messages sent to those who do and do not 
give consent to receive such messages, is almost identical. With only a few exceptions, 
most e-commerce sites honor the choice exercised by the registrants. Under both regimes, 
a few websites flood their registrants with commercial email messages, disregarding the 
latters’s wishes. Registrants who indicate their willingness to receive commercial email 
messages receive a comparable level of message traffic under both regimes.  
On the notice/awareness dimension (i.e., participants receiving timely notice of an 
entity’s information and privacy policies), by most measures, the standards and 
enforcement regime of the U.K. is no better than the evolutionary regime of the U.S., and 
is inferior on some dimensions. For example, in spite of the privacy law and enforcement 
mechanism, fewer U.K. websites post their privacy policies. It is more difficult to find the 
privacy policy statement on U.K. websites even when they are posted. These websites are 
less likely to disclose the use of cookies and how the data gathered is used for secondary 
internal, and external marketing purposes. 
In the absence of legislated standards and their government enforcement, a market 
for web assurance services, including privacy assurance, has arisen in the U.S. About a                                                                                                                                




third of the U.S. websites in the JMS [2003] sample chose to pay a small fee to the sellers 
of such services (e.g., TRUSTe and BBB Online) and had them certify that: (1) The 
website policies conformed to the privately developed standards of the assurance service 
provider, and (2) The website practices conformed to the website’s stated policies. The 
U.S. websites that displayed the service providers’ assurance seals performed at least as 
well as, and on average better than, the U.K. websites in protecting the privacy of their 
users.  
 The legislation and enforcement mechanisms in the U.K. and the EU were set up 
on the assumption that they will help improve privacy on the Internet. Our comparative 
study of the U.K. and the U.S. reveals that privacy has fared no better, and perhaps 
worse, in the U.K. than in the unregulated U.S. environment. How could we explain this 
apparent disparity? 
 
5.1 Statutory Law and Social Conventions 
Codified standards with formal enforcement are concrete and salient. E xtant 
standards are published, easily disseminated, specified formally with some precision, and 
can be analyzed and discussed.
6 They come into existence at a specific time, through a 
known and understood institutional process that may allow the participation of the 
constituents. When the environment changes, or the standards are no longer perceived to 
induce the desired patterns of behavior, there is a systematic process available to 
formulate changes and submit them to a well-specified process for possible promulgation.  
A transparent institutional mechanism for setting and modifying standards holds a 
natural appeal in a democratic polity. Following accidents and scandals, “the rules were 
not clear” is a popular defense for scoundrels and managers who have not adopted good 
data handling practices. Codification of standards—let us make the rules clear to all—is a 
frequently chosen response to calm the political waters. Formal written standards also 
appeal to our sense of good housekeeping.  
Social conventions and norms are less well defined, vary in time and space, and 
require an extended socialization process to learn and understand (Coleman [1990]). 
Conventions carry a penumbra of uncertainty about the edges; there is substantial but 
incomplete overlap among the beliefs of the individual members of a group about its 
                                                 
6 See Fuller [1964] and Dworkin [1986] for discussion of natural law theory.                                                                                                                                




norms. Even with a unique definition in time or place, norms evolve in small, almost 
imperceptible steps by processes that are not well understood. The evolution of norms is 
decentralized in the extreme, and even experts find it difficult to predict their direction. 
While the evolutionary process is not opaque, the lack of definition and our lesser 
understanding of how norms develop and evolve make them less transparent. When a 
scandal occurs, existing institutions face a legitimacy crisis, since the scandal itself 
mocks the claims of expertise and efficiency required to legitimize existing institutions. It 
is hardly surprising, then, that during periods of crises, political or bureaucratic decision 
makers feel pressure to write new standards rather than continue to rely on existing 
(recently discredited) norms and business practices. 
Formal standards require formal enforcement mechanisms to be effective.  
Government departments, courts and regulatory agencies, industry associations and 
private sector organizations in national and international domains monitor the 
implementation of various kinds of standards, and furnish procedures to impose penalties 
on violators. Formal enforcement of informal social conventions is difficult. However, 
social relationships among business participants makes it possible to create a “word-of-
mouth” mechanism where feedback and reputation can be enhanced (or damaged) rapidly 
and a sense of community can be formed among interested parties.  New Internet 
technologies make it possible for people to significantly expand these social networks 
(Dellarocas [2003]).   
As we have seen from the data presented in this paper from two jurisdictions, the 
opt-out regime works surprisingly well and almost identically in both. Exercising the opt-
out option enables users to avoid virtually all the junk email.
7  A few sites promise, but 
fail to honor the opt-out provision.  Formal regulation coupled with government 
enforcement appears to have little effect on the average behavior of websites. Moreover, 
formal regulation does not appear to provide protection from the extreme behavior of a 
few websites. This is consistent with what we observe in financial reporting: Enron, 
WorldCom and other companies were mired in accounting scandals in the most 
extensively regulated financial reporting environment in the world.  
                                                 
7 Note that registration and transactions at e-commerce sites are not the only source of email addresses for 
bulk junk mailers. Email address lists for spammers are compiled from many other sources, such as 
websites which list personal addresses, and from legitimate email.                                                                                                                                




With all its apparent advantages of clarity, explicitness, and the power of 
enforcement, the standards approach also suffers from several disadvantages relative to 
the evolutionary or social convention approach to regulation. In the following section we 
examine these issues in the context of financial reporting, although much of what we 
have to say is applicable to other fields.  
 
5.2 Standards vs. General Acceptance in Financial Reporting  
When the U.S. Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
and gave it the legal authority to regulate financial reporting in 1933, financial reporting 
practice was governed largely by convention. The first three decades of regulation were 
devoted largely to codifying these conventions into GAAP. These seven decades have 
seen a gradual, but inexorable, shift from convention or social norm approach to legally 
enforceable standards. The s hift is also reflected in the increasingly assertive 
nomenclature of the three private sector organizations entrusted with the task of writing 
accounting rules and their publications: The committee on Accounting Procedure’s 
Accounting Research Bulletins (1948-59), the Accounting Principles Board’s Opinions 
(1959-73), and the FASB’s Financial Accounting Standards (1973 to present).   
By the turn of the century, the social norm or convention approach of the earlier 
years is almost forgotten. The U.S., followed by much of the rest of the world, now 
favors a more formal legislated standards (with legal enforcement) model for financial 
reporting. Yet, the evidence that formal standards do any better than social norms of 
financial reporting remains elusive. To the extent the empirical evidence reported in this 
study on e-commerce privacy is relevant to financial reporting it goes the other way. 
In the following paragraphs, we consider four possible reasons for why formal 
legal standards with state enforcement, with their apparent advantages, may not be as 
effective as social norms in financial reporting. We label them as the information, design, 
gaming and signaling problems. 
 
The Information Problem 
 
The most difficult problem any rule maker faces is the identification of a good 
rule. Rules affect many members of society in diverse ways. The direct effect of the rules                                                                                                                                




on people depends on their individual circumstances that the rule maker knows little 
about.  Rules are designed in the hope that they will change or constrain, the behavior of 
at least some people. This change also depends on the individual circumstances not 
known to the rule maker. The changes in the behavior of individuals interact in complex 
ways to generate aggregate consequences that are often difficult to anticipate. The rule 
maker may try to ameliorate this informational disadvantage by soliciting information 
from the parties potentially affected by its actions. Unfortunately, these parties have little 
incentives to report truthfully, and their strategic responses only muddy the waters (see 
Sunder [1997], Chapter 11), and create the gaming problem discussed below, often 
forcing the rule maker to deal with unintended consequences of their rules.   
The evolution of social conventions proceeds in fits and starts, with little 
guarantee of progress.  Each small or large change in conventions is induced by and 
induces changes in individual behavior, moving the social system to a new, albeit 
temporary, expectations equilibrium (see Sunder [2002]).  People  get the chance to 
experience the consequences of each change, and adjust their behavior to the new 
circumstances.  Information in possession of the individuals that rule makers cannot 
capture for their decision-making gets aggregated into these outcomes through market 
and other social processes (see Hayek [1945]).  For this reason the evolved social norms 
often incorporate more information than the rules made by corporate entities, such as 
legislatures and boards. 
 
The Design Problem 
The  Corporate entities  for setting standards need a structure, people, and 
resources.  All three force compromises in the design of the entity.  Legislative structures 
emphasize representativeness, judicial structures emphasize impartiality, while 
bureaucratic structures value rules of procedure above all. It is not possible to attain 
perfect representativeness, impartiality, and consistency of procedure all at once. Finding 
the people to operate the rule-making system runs into parallel problems. The best 
experts may not be representative or impartial, and they may be inclined to use their 
judgment over pre-defined procedures.  Representative bodies may lack expertise in the 
substance of the matter, and do not place impartiality high on their agenda, and so on. 
Finally, those who pay for the cost of developing standards seek their own agendas                                                                                                                                




through their influence over the finances of the standard-setting entity. Such inevitable 
compromises “corrupt” the standard-setting bodies. The gradual evolution of social 
conventions can be said to be free of these weaknesses of corporate entities because such 
entities do not play a major role in the process. 
The Gaming Problem 
The difficulty posed by the information problem discussed above is compounded 
by the dynamics between rules and the behavior the rules are intended to influence. Each 
standard alters the decision environments of the relevant individuals, and at least 
potentially alters their decisions. Standards also induce the individuals to search for new 
alternatives, or create opportunities that may not have existed earlier. The rule makers, 
with limited information, cannot anticipate all such changes, and the rules often lead to 
unintended consequences in the form of individual behavior and their social outcomes. 
For example, Tan and Jamal [2003] found that changing discretion in accounting rules 
has an unintended effect of changing the “real” operating decisions of managers. Any 
adjustment of the rules to such outcomes sets up yet another cycle of adjustments and 
changes. Individuals can adjust faster than the rule makers can. It is difficult to make sure 
that this action-reaction sequence converges to a rule and pattern of behavior, which are 
in equilibrium with each other.  Informality and the flexibility of social norms have a 
better chance of effectively dealing with this gaming problem through evolution stretched 
over a long period of time. 
The Signaling Problem 
A formal standards approach to financial reporting favors narrowing the range of 
options available to the reporting entity.  Many believe that a narrower set of choices 
available to the accounting entity in how to report a given event or transaction promotes 
comparability and consistency, and enhances the value of financial statements. Valid as 
this argument might be, it also ignores the signaling value of the choices made by the 
reporting entity. In making a choice from a given set of alternatives, the entity cannot 
help but reveal information it holds privately about its preferences and expectations. 
Managers of the entity reveal their privately held information, in part, through the 
financial reporting methods they choose (Levine [1996]). The use of aggressive reporting                                                                                                                                




methods gives valuable information to careful readers of the financial reports. Narrowing 
financial reporting choices through strict standards also eliminates the ability of managers 
to transmit information through their choice of financial reporting methods. 
6. Conclusion 
One consequence of a legislated approach to setting e -commerce privacy 
standards appears to be the elimination, or preclusion, of a market for private web 
assurance.  Since the law in the U.K. specifies privacy disclosure requirements, and there 
is no legal requirement to purchase a privacy audit certificate, there is no market for 
privacy assurance seals.  Contrary to its intent, the privacy disclosure law appears to have 
eliminated the incentives for the websites to use web-seals as signals of their good 
privacy practices to consumers. 
In financial reporting, the legal requirement of independent audit of publicly held 
firms seems to serve as an obstacle to the efficient functioning of a market for audit 
services. If independent audit were not a legal requirement, firms with sufficient 
confidence in their accounts and in their prospects would spend the money to hire 
reputable independent auditors to convince their shareholders about their transparency 
and good prospects. Firms without such confidence will not find it worthwhile to hire 
auditors.  Investors, presented with reports with and without auditor certificates will have 
to make their own risk assessments and price the securities accordingly. Without 
government regulation, a market for certification or audit services would develop 
analogous to the U.S. market for web services in e -commerce. JMS [2003] adduce 
evidence of a web certification market for privacy assurance, and DeWally and 
Ederington [2003] analyze the evolution and functioning of an audit certification service 
for online comic book auctions on eBay.  Instead of allowing such a market to develop, 
the SEC requires all firms to have their reports audited, and tries to specify the standards 
by which the auditing must be carried out.  The extensive regulation of audit practice has 
been accompanied by commoditization of the audit, and the widespread auditing scandals 
of recent years. 
In the absence of mandated standards, U.S. websites tend to view the disclosure of 
privacy policies as an instrument of their marketing strategy to attract consumers.                                                                                                                                




Accordingly, they make it easy to find their statements of policy, and adhere to these 
policies reasonably closely. U.K. websites, on the other hand, appear to view privacy 
disclosure as merely a compliance matter; they appear to be, at the very least, indifferent 
to the consumer concerns about their privacy policies, and on average, make it more 
difficult than in U.S. for their customers to find their statements of policy.  
Our conclusions from the comparison between U.S. and U.K. data should be 
moderated by several considerations. First, the data in the U.S. were gathered one year 
earlier. The U.S. disclosure data collection (July) and website registrations  (August) 
were done by JMS in the summer of 2001, whereas our U.K. disclosure data collection 
(May/June) and website registrations (September) were done in the summer of 2002. It is 
possible that a shift in the e-commerce practices may have occurred during this interval, 
eroding the validity of the comparisons presented here. 
Second, we are careful registrants who opt-out immediately upon registration and 
follow the JMS [2003] procedure of visiting only high traffic and reputable websites. It is 
possible that less careful registrants may get much larger volumes of unwanted (spam) 
email.  
Third, there are many differences between the U.K. and the U.S., and between e-
commerce privacy and financial reporting which require us to exercise caution in making 
analogies from one jurisdiction to another (Healy [2003]). Our study is not a perfectly 
controlled experiment, so an inferential leap must be made across these jurisdictional 
differences.   
Law, auditors, reputation, business norms and practices, warranties, disclosure, 
and industry associations are competing trust creation mechanisms associated with 
markets. The value of each mechanism depends on the set of mechanisms available in a 
particular market. While each mechanism may be useful in isolation, the marginal value 
of some over others may be small. A large body of literature in psychology (Cook 
[2001]), sociology (Granovetter [1985]) and political science (Putnam [1993]) suggests 
that key trust creation mechanisms in society are personal relationships and social 
embeddedness of market participant’s rather then legal rules and formal enforcement 
structures. Our results suggest that the value of legal regulation and enforcement may be                                                                                                                                




overestimated when the availability of alternative trust generation mechanisms is ignored 
in studies of accounting regulation.  Future research can help us understand the 
incremental value of formal legal regulation and enforcement in situations where other 
trust creation mechanisms are available.                                                                                                                                
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In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003]) programmed a web crawler 
to repeatedly visit 100 selected high traffic websites in the U.S. during the week of July 
23-29, 2001, and to record what cookies (and third party cookies) are used by these 
websites to monitor visitors to the websites.  JMS then download the privacy policies of 
these 100 websites and record the number of websites who disclose their use of cookies 
(and third party cookies), as well as disclosures on how data collected from participants is 
used and shared internally and with external third parties.  U.S. websites are classified 
into two groups: those that purchase an independent web assurance seal (n=34), and those 
who do not have a web-seal (n=66). We applied the JMS procedure during the period of 
May 27 -June 12, 2002 for 56 high traffic U.K. websites which are governed by EU 
privacy law. A U.K. government body monitors and enforces the privacy law in the U.K. 
None of the U.K. websites had a web-seal. 
                                                                                                                                




Table 2: Mean (Standard Deviation) Number of Email Messages Received For Opt-
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Average 8.44  9.20  3.81  3.18  0.45  0.75 
 
In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003]) constructed 200 identities 
(name, address, email address) and attempt to register twice on each of 100 high traffic 
websites in the U.S. In the opt-in registrations (n=69), JMS allow the website to use their 
personal data for both internal marketing purposes, and to sell personal data to external 
third parties. In the opt-out registrations (n=43), JMS do not allow the website to use their                                                                                                                                




data for any secondary purpose. We applied the JMS field experiment methodology to 56 
high traffic websites in the U.K.  Out of the 56 websites, 40 U.K. websites allowed us to 
opt-in, and 25 websites allowed us to opt-out.                                                                                                                                 
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In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003]) constructed 200 identities 
(name, address, email address) and attempted to register twice on each of 100 high traffic 
websites in the U.S. In the opt-in registrations (n=69), JMS allowed the website to use 
personal data for both internal marketing purposes, and to sell personal data to external 
third parties. In the opt-out registrations (n=43), JMS did not allow the website to use 
personal data for any secondary purpose.  JMS tracked the number of email messages 
received at each registered address over the twenty-six week period following the 
registration.  We applied the JMS procedure on 56 U.K. websites regulated by EU 
privacy law. From our 56 websites in the U.K., 40 websites allowed an opt-in, and 25 
websites allowed us to opt-out.  Raw data for this chart are shown in Table 2. Figure 1 
shows the average number of messages received by all U.S. and U.K. opt-in sites, 
average number of messages for all U.S. and U.K. opt-in sites except one outlier removed 
from both the U.S. and the U.K, and the average number of messages received from all 
U.S. and U.K. opt-out sites.                                                                                                                                




Figure 2: Cumulative Percent of Email Received From Volume Ranked Opt-In 

















































































UK OPT-IN (40 Sites)
US OPT-IN (69 Sites)
In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003]) constructed 100 identities 
(name, address, email address) and attempted to register on each of 100 high traffic 
websites in the U.S. In the opt-in registrations JMS allowed the website to use their 
personal data for both internal marketing purposes, and to sell data to external third 
parties. Sixty-nine websites allowed JMS to register and opt-in. JMS tracked the number 
of email messages received in each registered address over a 26-week period.  We 
replicate the JMS procedure in the U.K. for 56 high traffic websites. Forty of these 
websites allowed us to opt-in. We chart the number of email messages received at each of 
our opt-in and opt-out addresses.  
 
In the U.S., one site alone, (an outlier), generated 56 percent of all opt-in messages 
indicated by the first circle on the chart.  The five highest volume sites generated 80 
percent of the total opt-in messages. In the U.K. (light square symbol in the figure), one 
site generated approximately 63 percent of all messages. The five highest volume sites 
generated 83 percent of the total opt-out messages.  Note that the vertical scale has been 






                                                                                                                                




Figure 3: Cumulative Percent of Email Received From Volume Ranked Opt-Out 







































































UK OPT-OUT (24 Sites)
US OPT-OUT (40 Sites)
In a field experiment, Jamal, Maier and Sunder (JMS [2003]) constructed 100 identities 
(name, address, email address) and attempted to register twice on each of 100 high traffic 
websites in the U.S.  In the opt-out registrations JMS did not allow the website to use 
data for any secondary purpose.  Out of the 100 websites, 43 allowed JMS to register and 
opt-out. JMS tracked the number of email messages received in each registered address 
over a 26-week period.  We replicate the JMS procedure in the U.K. for 56 high traffic 
websites. Twenty-five  U.K. websites allowed us to opt-out. We chart the number of 
email messages received at each of our opt-in and opt-out addresses. In the U.S., one site 
alone, (dark circle), generated 62 percent of all opt-out messages indicated by the first 
circle on the chart.  The five highest volume sites generated 91 percent of the total opt-
out messages. In the U.K. (light square symbol in the figure), one site generated 
approximately 93 percent of all messages. The five highest volume sites generated 97 
percent of the total opt-out messages. Note that the vertical scale has been truncated at 50 
percent in order to highlight the differences in the 90-100 percent range.                                                                                                                                





  Appendix A 
 
  U.K. Data Protection Act 1984 (Amended in 1998 For Compliance 








SCHEDULE 1: THE DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
  
   PART I:  THE PRINCIPLES 
       1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall 
not be processed unless-  
  
   (a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met (requirements of 
informed consent), and 
   (b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in 
Schedule 3 is also met. 
       2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that 
purpose or those purposes. 
  
       3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
  
       4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
  
       5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for 
longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
  
       6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects 
under this Act. 
  
       7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss 
or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
  
       8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the 
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate 
level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the 
processing of personal data. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                






Enforcement Activity By The U.K. Information Commissioner  
For the Five Year Period From  1997 - 2002 
 
  1997/98  1998/99  1999/00  2000/01  2001/02 
Total Budget  £ 3,661,690  £ 4,190,489  £ 4,721,666  £ 5,280,860  £ 8,244,982 
# Of Staff  109  118  114  126  157 
# Of Phone 
Inquiries 








471  700  388  480  448 
Visits - 
Dwellings 








136  216  98  144  58 
Court 
Prosecutions 




38  55  130  21  33 
 
The Information Commissioner enforces and oversees the Data Protection Act 1998. The 
Commissioner is a U.K. independent supervisory authority reporting directly to the U.K. 
Parliament. The Commissioners mission is: "We shall develop respect for the private 
lives of individuals and encourage the openness and accountability of public authorities. 
Promoting good information handling practices and enforcing data protection and 
freedom of information legislation; and seeking to influence national and international 
thinking on privacy and information access issues."   
 
This information on the Budget and Enforcement activity of the U.K. Information 
Commissioner was obtained from the Commissions annual reports which can be obtained 
at http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/ar2001annrep/ 
 